BlockBeats reported on August 12 that AI security startup Attestable officially launched and completed a $20 million seed funding round. The round was led by Jamin Ball of Altimeter Capital and Yonatan Mandelbaum of TLV Partners, with participation from Halcyon Futures, Cerca Partners, and other investors.

Yogi, founder of Attestable, stated that as AI increasingly penetrates critical infrastructure, national security, and large enterprise systems, verifying the credibility of AI operations has become a crucial global challenge. The company aims to build a universal verification layer for cutting-edge AI labs, critical infrastructure, and national-level applications.

Attestable utilizes zero-knowledge proof technology to shift trust in AI systems from data centers to mathematical verification mechanisms. This technology can prove that an approved model, model weights, input data, and operating strategy do indeed generate a specific output, without revealing model parameters or user privacy data, and verification can be completed without rerunning the model.

Attestable states that its technology has already achieved verification inference of the Meta Muse Glimmer 30B model on a single NVIDIA H100 GPU, reaching a speed of 85 tokens per second. The generated proof files are small, quantum-safe, and can be verified quickly.

In response, Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin stated that this achievement means the performance overhead of zero-knowledge proofs for large language models has approached single-digit levels. He indicated that the next challenge is to further reduce the performance overhead of technologies such as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE).

According to BlockBeats, on August 12, the cross-chain bridge connecting XRP Ledger and Coreum was attacked on August 9. The attackers stole approximately 199,916 XRP through the vulnerability, causing the bridge's asset balance to drop from approximately 200,410 XRP to only 493.5 XRP.

Analysis shows that this attack was not targeted at the XRP Ledger itself, nor did it involve the leakage of private keys. Instead, it exploited a vulnerability in the Coreum cross-chain bridge verification logic. The attacker forged a fake deposit transaction, causing the bridging system to identify it as a genuine deposit and trigger the other end of the bridging wallet to send real XRP to the attacker.

On-chain data shows that the attacker completed the fund transfer through 94 multi-signature authorized transactions within 97 minutes. These transactions required signatures from 17 out of 28 relay node keys, meaning the attacker successfully bypassed the bridging system's verification mechanism.

As of August 11, the Coreum cross-chain bridge remains suspended, and the Coreum Development Foundation has not yet released an official incident report. This incident affects third-party cross-chain infrastructure, not a vulnerability in the XRP Ledger protocol layer; the XRP mainnet and user private key security have not been affected.